Importance. Approximately one-third of U.S. life sciences faculty engage in industry consulting. Despite reports that consulting contracts often impinge on faculty and university interests, institutional approaches to regulating consulting agreements are largely unknown.
data were analyzed using Stata 10 (College Station, TX). Multivariable logistic regression was 71 used to examine school characteristics as predictors of oversight approach, applying a 72 significance level of 0.05 in two-tailed tests. Some free-text responses were qualitatively 73 analyzed. The study was approved by the Harvard School of Public Health institutional review 74 board. All participants gave written informed consent to research participation. a Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. b At institutions' request, two informants were interviewed at each of 12 institutions. Fourteen administrators each had responsibility for oversight at two or more affiliated schools.
85
Fourteen key informants represented more than one school within their university. At 12 86 institutions, we interviewed two informants because administrators suggested we speak with 87 someone at both the school and the university/health campus level. Their responses were merged 88 because institutions were the unit of analysis. Addendum provisions required to be included 7 6% Addendum available listing recommended provisions 7 6% Other 5 5% a Denominator for proportions (112) is the number of "affiliated schools" (universities where a single administrator handled matters for 2 or more schools) plus the number of "unaffiliated" schools of medicine plus the number of "unaffiliated" schools of public health. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding or because response categories were not mutually exclusive (e.g., 7 schools coupled mandatory review for some types of agreements with optional review for others).
105
Many institutions described oversight approaches other than reviewing consulting 106 agreements. Twenty-two (20%) said that information about restrictive provisions might be 107 elicited during the school's fCOI disclosure process, but acknowledged that this typically 108 occurred after contract execution. Thirteen (12%) attempted to persuade faculty to convert 109 consulting contracts to sponsored research agreements, which would be reviewed by the school's Qualifications of contract reviewers 117 The 73 institutions that reviewed consulting agreements on either an optional or a 118 mandatory basis reposed responsibility for such review in a variety of types of administrators.
119
Most common was the office of legal counsel (51%), followed by offices of research 120 administration or industry relations (41%) and offices of technology transfer or intellectual Responses to problematic provisions in consulting agreements 149 When reviewers identified a seemingly problematic provision in a consulting contract, 150 only some took assertive action ( 
157
Commonly, reviewers simply alerted faculty to problematic provisions and left the matter 158 in the faculty member's hands (36%). Seventeen institutions (23%) advised faculty to hire an 159 outside attorney to resolve the issue. 
177
Institutions that required review of consulting contracts pointed to these risks when 178 explaining the reasons for their approach ( Table 5 ). Many expressed the desire to avoid legal 179 problems or public scandals over faculty activities, while a few pointed to the need to safeguard 180 the university's intellectual property or voiced a sense that mandatory review of consulting 181 contracts was the responsible thing to do. 
183
A view that consulting agreements are private matters, outside of faculty members' 184 employment obligations and the university's purview, was the primary reason that institutions 185 made contract review optional (13%) or unavailable (36%). However, more than a third (36%) of 186 the schools at which review was unavailable indicated that the issue of restrictive provisions in 187 these contracts simply had not been on their radar screens. A minority of schools that did not 188 provide review gave substantive reasons for rejecting that approach ( behavior, they are potentially of even greater concern than fCOI. Shortcomings of current oversight 224 The important interests at stake call into question the traditional view of consulting 225 agreements as private arrangements subject only to self-regulation by faculty and companies. In harm is largely anecdotal [14, 37, 38] , but the potential for harm and the spottiness of existing 267 review practices raise questions about whether greater oversight should be exercised.
Management approaches could range from faculty training to mandatory review of 269 consulting agreements. [19] Approaches that vest discretion in faculty to seek review may prove 270 ineffectual because faculty may not appreciate the risks involved [16] The irony of not regulating consulting contracts because they are "private" is that there is 286 no obligation more fundamental for a tax-exempt organization than to be operated for the public 287 benefit, and inappropriate contracts may divert institutional resources away from public 288 purposes. Greater recognition of the ways in which faculty members' putatively private 289 consulting activities implicate public and institutional interests can promote the integrity of these 290 valuable but ethically fraught relationships.
